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Introduction: Toward a Theory of Attention That Includes 
Effortless Attention and Action
Brian Bruya
Attention and action require effort, and, under normal circumstances, the higher the 
demands of a course of action, the greater the effort required to sustain a level of effi-
cacy (Grier et al. 2003; Kahneman 1973). Although a clear distinction is rarely made, 
effort is generally presumed to be both objective (as calories consumed) and subjective 
(as experienced effortfulness). There are times, however, when attention and action 
seem to flow effortlessly,1 allowing a person to meet an increase in demand with a 
sustained level of efficacy but without an increase in felt effort—even, at the best of 
times, with a decrease (Csikszentmihalyi 1975; Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi 
1988; Dobrynin 1966).
Under normal circumstances, the expectation is that expenditure of effort increases 
with the level of demands until effort reaches a maximum point at which no more 
increase is possible (Kahneman 1973; see figure I.1).
Sometimes, however, when the level of demand reaches a point at which one is 
fully engaged, one is given over to the activity so thoroughly that action and attention 
seem effortless (see figure I.2).
That subjective effort can follow this path of unexpected decrease without a decre-
ment in performance is clearly supported by the literature (Csikszentmihalyi, this 
volume; 1975; Dormashev, this volume; Ullén, this volume; Csikszentmihalyi and 
Csikszentmihalyi 1988; Dobrynin 1966; Jackson and Csikszentmihalyi 1999). Whether 
objective effort follows the same path is less clear, but there is evidence to suggest that 
it is possible (Wulf and Lewthwaite, this volume). Either way, because the objective–
subjective distinction is rarely made in regard to discussions about effort, evidence 
shows that the accepted theoretical framework of increased effort to meet increased 
demand falters. This failure of our accepted framework to accommodate effortlessness 
has likely been the reason for its long neglect as a subject of serious investigation and 
for artists and philosophers to attribute its causes to the mystical, the divine, or the 
Freudian unconscious.
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1975) identified the phenomenon of effortlessness as 
autotelic experience—when a person’s full engagement in an activity provides ongoing 
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impetus for attention and action—and found it across a wide variety of activity 
domains, from rock climbing to chess, from factory line working to intimate conversa-
tion.2 Using a novel data collection procedure (Hektner, Schmidt, and Csikszentmih-
alyi 2007) that allowed for better monitoring of naturalistic activities, Csikszentmihalyi 
achieved a great deal on the descriptive level, isolating the phenomenon and detailing 
the manner of its occurrence, its duration, its depth, its phenomenal characteristics, 
its variability, its breadth across populations, its parameters of occurrence, and its 
psychological value. Through his work, autotelic experience (commonly known as 














Effort versus demands in effective action—effortless experience.





A professor who has given the same classroom lecture 10 times over the past five years 
gives it again on two occasions over two semesters.
Effortful Experience
Outside of class, the professor is struggling with a particularly trying bit of research, a 
student he failed for cheating has taken the matter to the administration, a recent faculty 
meeting exploded in accusations and acrimony, and a close family member is ill. Inside 
of class, he is in an unfamiliar room, his new shoes are hurting his feet, the temperature 
is unusually warm, and students are lethargic. Under these conditions,* the professor 
experiences a frustrating lecture. Examples fall flat, insightful points come haltingly, if at 
all, and conclusions feel awkward and indecisive. Unexpected questions from students are 
met with hems and haws. There is a feeling of self-consciousness—that the lecture is not 
going well. There is a feeling of interminability during the lecture and of relief and fatigue 
after the lecture. 
Effortless Experience
Outside of class, the professor just sent off a revised manuscript for publication, he recently 
won an award for teaching excellence, and his new research assistant is buoyant and eager. 
Inside of class, conditions are familiar, and students are responsive. The lecture goes 
smoothly, punctuated at appropriate moments by examples and insightful asides that meet 
bright eyes and nods of understanding. Unexpected questions are deftly assimilated to the 
material with humor and aplomb. Conclusions neatly wrap up sections and lead naturally 
to subsequent sections. There is no feeling of self-consciousness during the lecture but a 
retrospective feeling of diminished sense of time and that the lecture came off automati-
cally and with ease. There is a feeling after the lecture of zest and that it could have been 
continued indefinitely without fatigue.
* There are many possible obstacles to effortlessness; others could be extreme demands, 
low demands, lack of interest, unexpected interruptions, lethargy, negative affect, and so 
on. (The effect of unfavorable conditions is not a necessary one. Conceivably, in the first 
experience the professor could have overcome the obstacles and experienced an effortless 
lecture.)
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an illustration of how the same activity can be carried out with and without a feeling 
of flow). 
Because of its occurrence largely in naturalistic settings, however, and perhaps due 
to its vestigial mysteriousness, autotelic experience has been resistant to explanatory 
analysis. Therefore, fundamental questions regarding the cognitive science of effort-
lessness have, until now, been neither asked nor answered.
In a separate program in the Soviet Union, descriptive research was conducted 
by N. F. Dobrynin, D. I. Gatkevich, and N. V. Lavrova (Dobrynin 1966; Dormashev, 
this volume) under the rubric of postvoluntary attention—attention that was neither 
voluntary (effortful) nor involuntary (automatic). Postvoluntary attention is charac-
terized in the literature as attention that has been captured by an absorbing, interest-
ing, and meaningful activity and that can be sustained willingly and productively 
for a long period of time. Unfortunately, the bulk of this literature remains 
untranslated.
Despite the difficult questions remaining, research into effortless attention and 
action should be viewed not as an esoteric discipline but instead as a welcome chal-
lenge to test, refine, and even alter current models of attention and action. In order 
for any model of behavior to be considered comprehensive, it must be able to account 
for all types of human action. As Daniel Kahneman and Anne Treisman have said, 
“While we continue to work within the old framework [of attention], we should 
remain alert to the possibility that it could soon become obsolete” (Kahneman and 
Treisman 1984, p. 57). Bernhard Hommel recommends that in order to make future 
advances in developing a full model of human action, our most basic concepts must 
be clarified (Hommel 2007). The present volume submits the concept of effortless 
attention for such consideration.
In this introduction, I isolate seven topics concerning which scholars have pro-
duced theories and results pertinent to a nascent theory of effortlessness. I offer a 
summary of these (“Overview”), show how the topic of effortlessness may reveal gaps 
in the current literature and challenge current theoretical models (“Challenges–Gaps”), 
delineate potential aspects of a future theory of effortless attention and action 
(“Theory”), and discuss how the chapters in this volume mark advances in that direc-
tion (“Advances”). The categories do not necessarily reflect the intentions of the con-
tributors or fully encompass current paradigms in cognitive science, and they are best 
considered one possible attempt at a heuristic for approaching this unwieldy topic. 
Further, the “Advances” discussions are necessarily brief and discuss how each chapter 
contributes to our understanding of only one issue in particular. Readers will find that 
the chapters are usually broader than that, often speaking importantly on several of 
these issues.





Two general kinds of effort have been distinguished in the literature—mental effort 
and physical effort (Smit, Eling, Hopman, and Coenen 2005), which are conceptually 
dissociable. For instance, in the development of overlearned action, the same level of 
physical effort is subject to decreasing amounts of mental effort. Nevertheless, mental 
effort must also have a physiological basis and has been approached by researchers 
and theorists under two general headings: attention and self-regulation (see box I.2 
for terminology relevant to this field of inquiry). 
William James defined attention as the effortful holding of something before one’s 
mind (James 1983). Daniel Kahneman (1973) identified attention as mental effort, 
postulating that maintenance of attention can be under voluntary control but 
intensity of attention cannot. William Sarter has delineated a neuronal model of 
“attentional effort” that describes the mechanisms for initiation of top–down 
control of attention (Sarter, Gehring, and Kozak 2006). According to Sarter, when 
attention is threatened, performance monitoring (prefrontal–anterior cingulate) and 
motivational (mesolimbic) systems are recruited and integrated, manifesting as atten-
tional effort.
Philosophers have long used “will” as a term that indicates subjective effort 
(Schulkin 2007). Research psychologists have preferred “self-regulation” or “self-
control” (Baumeister and Vohs 2005; Rothbart 2005; Vohs and Baumeister 2004)—the 
Box I.
Working Definitions
Objective effort (exertion) an increase in the metabolic or physiological processes of move-
ment (physical effort) or thought (mental effort).
Subjective effort the feeling of exertion.
Effortful description of attention or action in which there is subjective effort under normal 
conditions.
Autotelic description of an experience in which one feels that the activity provides the 
impetus for action, involving a challenging activity that requires skill, the merging of 
action and awareness, clear goals and immediate feedback, concentration on the task at 
hand, a feeling of being in control, a loss of self-consciousness, and an altered sense of 
time.
Effortless description of attention or action that (1) is not experienced as effortful or (2) 
involves exertion and, due to the autotelicity of experience, subjective effort is lower than 
in normal conditions, with effectiveness maintained at a normal or elevated level.
Postvoluntary effortless (2).
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ability to accomplish one’s goals and to refrain from actions that contravene one’s 
goals. Studies have shown that self-regulation is a limited resource, that this resource 
can be depleted through prior effort (e.g., choices), and that its maintenance can 
be affected by cognitive states such as bias or a feeling of autonomy (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice 1998; Inzlicht 2006; Moller, Deci, and Ryan 2006; 
Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister 1998; Schmeichel and Baumeister, this volume).
Challenges–Gaps
Current theories of attention identify attention with effort and rarely distinguish 
between objective and subjective effort. Such theories are unable to account for atten-
tion that is high in intensity but low in subjective effort. Is a synchronic decrease in 
objective effort also possible without a performance decrement? If so, is it akin to, or 
dependent on, the efficiency of overlearned action achieved diachronically? How can 
the two be distinguished on functional and physiological levels?
Further, the phenomenon of effortlessness complicates the notion of executive 
control. In autotelic experience, subjects report that they are able to exert excep-
tional control over the subtlest responses in an activity but without a feeling of 
executive control. They report that they can be completely focused on a task but feel 
as if only a slight effort is expended (Csikszentmihalyi 1975; Csikszentmihalyi and 
Csikszentmihalyi 1988). Lionel Naccache and colleagues report that executive control 
and the feeling of effort are dissociable (Naccache et al. 2005; see also Lafargue, 
Paillard, Lamarre, and Sirigu 2003).
These two challenges to current models raise many fundamental questions about 
the relationship between attention and effort and even about the nature of mental 
effort, itself.
Theory
Nearly five decades ago Gunnar Borg (1962) demonstrated a reliable correlation 
between objective and subjective physical effort that is still the basis of psychophysi-
ological instruments today. A similar correlation between objective and subjective 
mental effort has been presumed but not verified. Several scales of subjective workload 
are used in human factors research, but none of the major scales distinguish clearly 
between mental and physical subjective effort (Rubio, Díaz, Martín, and Puente 2004). 
Any presumption of an outright correlation between objective and subjective mental 
effort appears to have been contradicted by Csikszentmihalyi’s and Dobrynin’s find-
ings.3 A theory of effortlessness will have to clearly define objective and subjective 
mental effort by delineating their functional and physiological features.
Advances
1. Shared resources of self-regulation and attention In their chapter for this volume, 
Brandon Schmeichel and Roy Baumeister demonstrate that under normal circum-
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stances attention and self-regulation draw from a shared limited resource. Research 
with colleague Gailliot (Gailliot et al. 2007) suggests that this resource is glucose. Thus, 
under normal circumstances, objective mental effort (in the form of attention and 
self-regulation), like objective physical effort, appears to have a measurable and manip-
ulable physiology.
2. Decrease in objective effort during attention Gabriele Wulf and Rebecca Lewthwaite 
show in this volume that the normal reduction in physical and mental objective effort 
(coupled with an increase in efficacy) that is achieved through typical diachronic 
practice can be enhanced synchronically. Through a slight shift in the focus of atten-
tion—from internal to external—subjects have consistently decreased their objective 
effort while increasing their efficacy. In other words, there is a direct correspondence 
between attention and effort such that both physical and mental effort can be reduced 
while one’s prior level of attention is maintained.
Topic : Decision Making
Overview
The study of decision making is now a mainstay of economics research (Tomlin et al. 
2006) and moral psychology (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, and Cohen 2004). Less 
attention has been focused on the fact that every action a person makes involves a 
choice of some kind, whether fully conscious or not. Jeffrey Schall has shown that 
choice (selection from among alternatives) is conceptually dissociable from both deci-
sion making (deliberation about selection) and action (overt indication of selection; 
Schall 2001).
Working within a more traditional framework, Mariano Sigman and Stanislaus 
Dehaene have reported that of the three stages of an action (perceptual, central, and 
motor), the first and third can work in parallel on different stages of different tasks, 
and only the central must work serially, hence accounting for time delay in delibera-
tive action (Sigman and Dehaene 2005).
A link between the autonomic nervous system and automatic action was rarely 
considered until Antonio Damasio and colleagues demonstrated that the autonomic 
nervous system plays a crucial role in some forms of decision making that lead to 
action (Damasio 1996, 1994). In essence, the autonomic nervous system sets the body 
and mind in proper form for reacting to uncertain but familiar circumstances.
A key component of automaticity is an individual’s level of response inhibition. 
Antoine Bechara, working with Damasio, has conducted seminal research into the role 
of response inhibition in decision making (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio 
1997; Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio 2000, 2003; Bechara 2004). In impulsive behav-
ior, according to Bechara, response inhibition fails, the decision-making process never 
engages, and a response based on previous success is initiated automatically. Different 
areas of the brain, he says, may be active, depending on which of three types of 
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decision (under certainty, under risk, and under ambiguity) is being made. If 
decisions under ambiguity are more likely, they will involve the orbitofrontal region 
and thereby engage the autonomic nervous system, which would slow processing 
down considerably.
Arne Dietrich has postulated that autotelic experience involves a decrease of neural 
activity in executive regions of the brain, specifically the anterior cingulate cortex 
(Dietrich 2004), which has been confirmed to be directly associated with the feeling 
of effort (Mulert, Menzinger, Leicht, Pogarell, and Hegerl 2005).
Challenges–Gaps
The above findings suggest that a complete theory of choice and decision making in 
human behavior would do well to include the actual neurophysiology of such pro-
cesses. Effortless attention complicates any such model because the distinction between 
executive control and decision making vanishes. Decision making in flow is fast and 
precise, implicating automatic action, but also creative and flexible, implicating pro-
cesses that are normally associated with executive control—though executive control 
processes are generally considered slow. Actually monitoring activation of brain areas 
in effortless attention may shed some light.
Theory
Recognizing Schall’s distinction between choice, decision making, and action 
and then identifying the neural mechanisms underlying each may be important in 
accounting for the precision of effortless action and the rapid choices that precede it. 
Under Sigman and Dehaene’s model, does effortless action (where rapid and accurate 
responses are characteristic) leave out the middle—deliberative—step, is it somehow 
integrated in a parallel fashion, or is there another way to account for it? Damasio 
and Bechara’s work may point to an important role for something like confidence 
in effortlessness—familiarity with an activity and confidence in one’s ability may 
(artificially?) push the subjective level of engagement from ambiguity toward 
certainty.
Advances
1. Response conflict, effort, and decision making In their contribution to this volume, 
Joseph McGuire and Matthew Botvinick show that an integral part of the decision-
making process involves evaluating the demand for cognition in a prospective task. 
Drawing on numerous studies, they postulate that the anterior cingulate cortex and 
nearby medial frontal cortex monitor the current output of cognitive resources and 
compare that to expected demand, resulting in a projected increase or decrease in 
needed cognition. This projected amount of control is then balanced against projected 
reward (nucleus accumbens), resulting in either an adjustment in cognitive resources 
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to meet expected demand or in avoidance. McGuire and Botvinick demonstrate, 
therefore, that mental effort is dissociable from cognitive control. Cognitive control 
is an ongoing process, and subjective mental effort is associated with the change in 
that process rather than with the process, itself. This shows us how it is possible that 
there can be a high level of cognitive control but a low level of subjective effort.
2. Effort in deliberative problem solving It is natural to think that the greater the effort 
applied to a task, especially one that is exclusively cognitive, the better the outcome 
will be. Marci DeCaro and Sian Beilock demonstrate that although effortful (i.e., linear, 
rule-based) problem-solving strategies often result in better performance, under real-
world conditions they can lose out to less effortful (i.e., associative, heuristic) strate-
gies. Such results provide another avenue for demonstrating that effortful attention 
and performance are dissociable.
3. Executive control is not necessarily conscious The status of executive control as a 
defining feature of the explicit processing system is called into question by Chris Blais. 
Blais shows through his research and studies by others that an instance of executive 
control that is generally taken as a paradigm case of executive control by researchers 
actually occurs outside of conscious awareness. Blais, therefore, calls into question the 
need for a distinction between explicit and implicit systems of control. The very phe-
nomenon of effortless attention, as explained above, seems to lead in the same direc-
tion, and Blais’s work may help in resolving this conundrum.
Topic : Action Syntax
Overview
Joaquín Fuster has examined the temporal role of executive function in attention and 
action, in which the automated behavior that is integrated into lower neural stages 
(premotor cortex, basal ganglia, hypothalamus, or other subcortical structures) is acti-
vated and modulated by the anterior cingulate cortex (high motivation, resolution of 
conflict), areas of lateral prefrontal convexity (set, integration of information across 
time), and orbital areas (inhibitory control). Temporal integration of behavior, Fuster 
says, is closely related to negotiating a syntax. Although syntax is most commonly 
associated with language, Fuster says that “linguistic syntax and motoric syntax seem 
to have a common phyletic origin” (Fuster 2003, p. 180). If the perception–action 
cycle involves the same, or functionally similar, neural mechanisms as those that allow 
us to negotiate grammar, it would go a long way in explaining certain elements of 
effortless action.
Matthew Botvinick (Botvinick and Plaut 2004; Botvinick 2007) has developed a 
recurrent connectionist network model that accounts for decision-making behavior 
in everyday routine tasks through transient, flexible hierarchies that rely on concur-
rent representation rather than enduring schemas. The resulting hierarchies are context 
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dependent and, as such, are appropriately vulnerable to distraction errors common in 
everyday behavior. Among other things, Botvinick’s computational model may help 
elucidate the role of attention in complex sequential actions.
Among other things (Ivry and Helmuth 2003), sequential actions involve neural 
timing mechanisms, particularly in the cerebellum (Ivry 1997; Ivry and Richardson 
2002; Ivry, Spencer, Zelaznik, and Diedrichsen 2002; Ivry and Spencer 2004a; Ivry and 
Spencer 2004b; Spencer, Ivry, and Zelaznik 2005), neural systems for force control and 
special trajectory planning (Diedrichsen, Verstynen, Hon, Zhang, and Ivry 2007; 
Spencer et al. 2005), and response selection (Bischoff-Grethe, Ivry, and Grafton 2002; 
Diedrichsen, Verstynen, Hon, Lehman, and Ivry 2003).
Challenges–Gaps
Syntax consists in a set of goals arranged in a hierarchy (within a circumscribed 
domain) that is constituted by defeasible rules temporally executed. Since effortless 
action is most often achieved in a well-demarcated activity, with constitutive rules, 
effortlessness (of attention and action) may be closely related to the process of nego-
tiating syntax. The notion of action syntax is still a novel one and must be integrated 
into any comprehensive model of action (Costanzo 2002). One important issue that 
it brings to the fore is the distinction between explicit rule following and optimal 
action within constraints (Langlois 1998). When adding cream and sugar to a cup of 
coffee (Botvinick and Plaut 2004), how does one decide which to add first? When 
playing a sequence of notes on the piano, how does one decide on the particular 
dynamics? Assimilating explicit rules (Bunge 2004) is only one step in executing 
action. Another step is applying the rules appropriately according to context, which 
can never be completely identical from one instance to the next.
Theory
A theory of effortlessness should embrace action syntax and explain at functional and 
physiological levels what it means to negotiate a syntax. It should distinguish between 
explicit rule syntax and constraint–parameter syntax and thereby account for the role 
of appropriateness in effective action (how quickly to stir, how much arc to put on 
the basketball, how to express a chord, whether to bluff or not, etc.). Such a theory 
should also elucidate the role of attention in complex, sequential actions. Where, 
when, and how is attention directed to relevant cues, and how is that relevance deter-
mined? Further, determining these aspects of attention will have important implica-
tions for training and education.
Advances
1. Action representation drives attention Where is one’s attention in downhill skiing? 
The pace of the activity is too fast for deliberation in conscious processing, and yet we 
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do attend fleetingly to this curve and that bump. Bernhard Hommel offers a theory for 
conceiving of attention not as necessarily consciousness driven and not as a system for 
managing scarce cognitive resources but as a “by-product of action control in a distrib-
uted processing system” (chapter 5, this volume). Hommel demonstrates that at its 
most fundamental level, attention is the process of perceptual systems filling parame-
ters in preestablished action programs as those action programs successively come 
online. A skier (on a good day) attends effortlessly to curves and bumps as needed to 
maintain success. Attention, according to Hommel, is normally experienced as effort-
less, and it is only when something comes between endogenous motivation and rele-
vant external cues (as in artificial laboratory tasks) that it is experienced as effortful. The 
apparent integration of perception and action in a single representational system 
appears to allow for immediate action-driven processing of syntactic cues.
2. Effortlessness as domain specific Through their unique methods of measuring 
dimensions of activities under normal circumstances, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and 
Jeanne Nakamura in their contribution to this volume demonstrate that effortless 
attention is most likely to be achieved under domain-specific conditions: clear, sequen-
tial, short-term goals; immediate feedback; and a balance between opportunities for 
action and the individual’s ability to act. When these conditions are met under con-
ducive circumstances, effortless attention is most likely to ensue. Further, they show 
that in circumstances of high attention experienced as effortless (as opposed to high 
attention experienced as effortful), subjects feel more involved, in control, unselfcon-
scious, relaxed, and as if they are putting their skills to more use.
3. Effortless attention in the lab Can these conditions be replicated in the laboratory? 
While Hommel suggests that the limitations of the laboratory setting are problematic 
in understanding effortless attention, and while Csikszentmihalyi and Nakamura have 
overcome those limitations by taking their research outside the lab, there is still some-
thing to be said for the prospect of introducing a naturalistic activity into the lab such 
that effortless attention can be induced in a setting that would allow for more sys-
tematic study and more intense monitoring. In their contribution to this volume, 
Arlen Moller, Brian Meier, and Robert Wall examine the attempts of several laborato-
ries, including their own, to induce flow by manipulating the balance between chal-
lenge and skills for subjects playing video games. While these teams have been 
successful in inducing many of the features of flow, the laboratory setting, itself, still 
presents a number of challenges. Moller, Meier, and Wall go on to examine such chal-
lenges and formulate suggestions for future research.
4. Syntax and the draw of attention In his contribution, Brian Bruya offers a new model 
of attention. Rather than a spotlight, or a filter, and so on, this model posits that 
attention may be profitably conceived of as a mechanism of sensitization that draws 
information relevant to dynamic contextual structures of reference through dynamic 
processing pathways. Contextual structures of reference compete spontaneously for 
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predominance in processing pathways, with predominance shifting rapidly and con-
stantly over time, accounting for transient selective attention. A semblance of sus-
tained, focused attention may be precariously achieved by inhibiting the intrusions 
of competing structures of reference, usually experienced as effortful to some degree. 
Occasionally, activity domains stabilize as temporary, predominant structures, inhibit-
ing competing structures of reference by virtue of the activity’s autotelicity, thereby 
allowing for sustained, focused attention that feels effortless.
Topic : Agency
Overview
David LaBerge’s triangular circuit theory of attention (LaBerge 1995, 1998, 2000) pos-
tulates an important role for the thalamus in attentional processing. According to the 
triangular circuit theory, attention just is conscious attention, or what LaBerge more 
precisely calls awareness. This theory postulates an internal representation of the self 
directly associated with the thalamus that provides the motivation or interest that 
amplifies preattentively selected stimuli for sustained attention.
Walter Freeman views the brain as a fundamentally intentional system (in the tradi-
tion of John Dewey) that essentially creates itself through goal-directed activity. 
Freeman views brain waves as the multiple manifestations of self-organizing nonlinear 
dynamic systems rooted in the electrochemical activity of neuron populations. Free-
man’s data (Freeman 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006), he says, support a view that neuron 
populations are self-organizing systems in which transient activity arises spontane-
ously, spreads across populations following basins of attraction, and then subsides, to 
be replaced by the next wave of activity. These basins of attraction represent conflu-
ences of meaning. One of the characteristics of effortless attention and action is 
heightened sensitivity to stimuli. Freeman’s theory of nonlinear dynamic systems in 
neuron populations provides a model for this kind of readiness, or preafference, as he 
calls it (Freeman 1999, 2000).
Transient selfhood has been a central concern of the philosopher Thomas Metz-
inger, who has developed a theory of the self that coheres with the latest results of 
neuroscientific research, especially research related to the broad functionality of the 
motor system (Metzinger and Gallese 2003; Metzinger 2003). According to his work, 
we can consider the self a unitary entity only in a phenomenal sense. In a functional 
sense, it is constructed and continuously remade (determined at the physiological level 
by particular neural processes).
Susan Hurley created a model of intentional action that links action, imitation, and 
simulation, and she speculated widely on the implications for this research with regard 
to social philosophy and ethics (e.g., Hurley and Chater 2005; Hurley 2005).
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A decision to act is not isolated but arises as a response to past events and in expec-
tation of future events. Marc Jeannerod, working closely with philosophical theory on 
the one hand and neuroscientific studies on the other, has contributed significantly 
to the transformation of our understanding of the motor functions of the brain from 
noncognitive action deployment to full-blown centers of planning, perception, predic-
tion, and complex social behavior (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003; Jeannerod 1988, 1997, 
2006). How the sense of agency is constructed and maintained is one of Jeannerod’s 
primary concerns because it appears to be at the heart of motor cognition. Without 
agency, there is no goal setting or subject of simulation or prediction.
Challenges–Gaps
A core challenge that effortlessness research poses to current models of attention and 
action is to answer the following question: When a decision to act is made, who is 
doing the deciding? Effortlessness brings to the foreground two issues fundamental to 
action: (1) When an act is attributed to a self, what exactly is a self, and (2) as men-
tioned above, is there really a clear demarcation between executive control and auto-
maticity? There are obviously distinct neuronal systems handling overlearned actions 
on the one hand and executive control on the other; effortless action highlights the 
need to study their integration because in this highly achieved form of action, a person 
seems to draw from them both with exquisite mastery. Freeman’s dynamic systems 
framework may help close these gaps by supplying to current models a kind of spon-
taneous sensitivity (see Alicia Juarrero 1999 for an insightful examination of dynamic 
systems theory, agency, and action).
LaBerge points out that awareness involving a self-representation is distinct 
from self-awareness. Nonetheless, the same question asked above may be asked here 
(applicable also to Jeannerod): How can such a theory account for the commonly 
reported phenomenon of a dropping away of a distinct sense of self in effortless 
attention and action? Also, is a self-representation solely a function of the thalamus, 
or are there important contributions from other specific areas of the brain, such as 
the medial cingulate where attributions to self and other are formed (Tomlin et al. 
2006)?
When attention is invested in an activity, it can be perceived as purely voluntary 
or carry a sense of compulsion. According to Csikszentmihalyi (1978) and Dobrynin 
(1966), effortless action is more likely achieved when attention is not only highly 
focused but also entirely voluntary—in pursuits that a person finds intrinsically worth-
while. Because effortlessness is often reported as a desirable state for both the enjoy-
ment and the efficacy of action that it affords (Csikszentmihalyi 1975), it exposes a 
gap in current literature with regard to the optimal structuring of an individual’s 
life. How can the achievement of effortless attention, on personal, pedagogical, and 
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managerial levels (Dobrynin 1966) be cultivated and encouraged for the sake of the 
acting agent?
Moving from the individual agent to the social agent, social behavior involves 
executing appropriate actions according to complex circumstances—evaluating subtle 
cues and responding without time for deliberation. Insofar as mirror neurons have 
been implicated in social action, as Hurley (among others) has done, many questions 
can be asked with regard to how much of social behavior is automatic and how much 
is voluntary and with how much robustness this distinction can even be maintained. 
Are the same mechanisms of effortless action also at work in social action (see also 
under “Automaticity” below)? If so, given that effortless attention and action are often 
cultivated in a practice regime, what are the implications for the possibility of achiev-
ing expertise in social action? Could such knowledge be applied at a personal or even 
a pedagogical level? What are the ethical implications?
Theory
Effortless attention and action may simply be the free running of Freeman’s inten-
tional system, but what does that mean for a persistent sense of self, especially if such 
a sense of self falls away during effortless activity? Because reports of effortlessness 
often involve the loss of coherence of a phenomenal sense of self (Csikszentmihalyi 
1975; Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi 1988; the feeling that the piano is 
playing itself or one is on “autopilot”), some aspects of functional selfhood seem to 
dissociate also. A comprehensive theory of perception and action would account not 
only for the role of the self in motivation but for the dissolution of the self in effort-
less attention and action. Further, it would explore the implications of “nonagentive” 
action in ethics, education, law, and public policy.
Advances
1. Self and the thalamus An important repository of anecdotal and speculative litera-
ture regarding effortless attention and action lies in the Asian philosophical traditions. 
In Zen Buddhism, for example, there are countless stories of acolytes who have prac-
ticed meditation for long periods and then, on encountering an unexpected, nonde-
script stimulus, suddenly experience a number of the hallmarks of effortless attention. 
In his contribution to this volume, neurologist James Austin considers how the sudden 
experience of a dropping away of a sense of self may have direct neurophysiological 
correlates. Drawing on research that distinguishes two attentional systems, he shows 
that distinct pathways between thalamic nuclei and the two attentional systems are 
likely implicated in the experience of a loss of a sense of self. He suggests that the 
blinking out of self-consciousness in a Zen enlightenment experience, and in effortless 
attention and action more broadly, may be due to deafferented cortical areas of the 
dorsal (egocentric) attentional system, traceable to deactivated thalamic nuclei. The 
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entire process is achieved, he suggests, through long practice regimens and their result-
ing neurophysiological effects.
2. Ethics and agency The findings in cognitive science that call into question the tra-
ditional conception of a unitary rational agent have profound implications for con-
temporary ethical theory. In his contribution to this volume, Edward Slingerland 
integrates results from the cognitive science of action with an ethical theory that takes 
effortless action to be the epitome of virtuous action. Through a detailed examination 
of philosophical and cognitive scientific accounts of human action, Slingerland con-
cludes that ethical human action is best characterized on a descriptive level in terms 
of a virtue ethics broadly construed. In other words, he says, humans generally act 
not from active cognitive control but from self-activating effortless dispositions that 
can be cultivated through introspection and education.
3. The person level in activity Researchers in twentieth-century Russian psychology 
recognized the primary importance of syntax in attention and action, adopting the 
rubric activity theory to describe their overall psychological framework. Yuri Dorma-
shev, in addition to giving an extraordinary introduction to activity theory in general 
and postvoluntary attention in particular, explains in his contribution to this volume 
that attention is best understood in terms of activity, functioning as a gestalt and 
focused on a limited range of objects. In postvoluntary attention, activity is organized 
at the person level, or personality (understood as the focal point of the driving hierar-
chy of motives in the cultural sphere). On this basis, Dormashev suggests that an 
important element missing from accounts of autotelic experience is that of personal 
taste—the interest, or broad aesthetic sense, that acts as a motivating force outside of 
organic and social motivations. The sense of transactional, embedded attention and 
action inherent in this view serves to unify the autonomous individual with the social 
and organic milieus in which—and through which—the individual develops.
Topic : Automaticity
Overview
Kahneman and Treisman point out that there has been a running debate among 
researchers of attention as to the role of automaticity in attention, with some research-
ers emphasizing early onset attention (selective processing–filtering) and some late 
onset (mental set/efficiency of action), and suggest that research into automaticity 
may help us bring the two closer together and away from mutual exclusivity (Kahne-
man and Treisman 1984; see also Pashler 1998).
In his analysis of available data, Marc Jeannerod (2006) suggests that the automated 
steps of an action come in for conscious access when there is discord between inten-
tion and actuality—when the perceptual representation does not match the action 
representation.
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John Bargh, researching the automaticity of social behavior, has concluded that 
much more of behavior than previously thought is outside of voluntary consciousness 
(Bargh 2000; Bargh and Chartrand 1999). He has recently proposed that a cascade 
model of language be applied to behavior (Bargh 2006; Ackerman and Bargh, this 
volume), explaining how actions proceed spontaneously from parallel processed goal 
activation, just as conversation occurs spontaneously while also being goal directed 
and falling within strict syntactic and semantic parameters.
Related to the cascade model is the theory of event coding put forward by Hommel, 
Müsseler, Aschersleben, and Prinz (2001; Hommel, this volume). Working in the tradi-
tion of Dewey (1896) and Gibson (1979), they suggest, as discussed briefly above, that 
perception and action are encoded in the brain in unitary fashion, accounting for the 
functional linking of the two as one. One result of this model is the postulate that 
actions are encoded in terms of their effects rather than in terms of explicitly under-
stood movements. The practical result of this is that attention in learning an action 
must be focused not on the intentional, voluntary aspect of a movement but on the 
effects of the movement (Wulf 2001, this volume).
Challenges–Gaps
These theories and findings, coupled with those under “Agency” and “Action Syntax” 
above, highlight a shift in research models from stimulus–response to what one might 
call sensitivity–responsiveness. Whereas the behaviorist model cut out intentional 
agency completely, the new models replace it with a multimodal agent, which, while 
not exactly being metaphysically free, is a bundle of preafference and readiness poten-
tials created in a complex array of self-organized neuronal populations, with their 
representational (or other) associations constantly arranged and rearranged through 
phylogenetic and historical factors. In many circumstances, the responsiveness of the 
agent appears to be a function of these associations.
Theory
If Jeannerod is correct that actions come into consciousness when perception does 
not match intention, it would help explain why effortless action, which reportedly 
occurs when expectations are consistently met, often seems outside of conscious 
awareness. On the other hand, it would also seem to leave high-level effortless action 
as purely automated, thereby seeming to preclude credit to a subject for creativity, 
insight, emotional expression, and so forth. A cascade model of behavior may work 
well for effortless action; in fact, effortless action, being generally domain dependent, 
may prove to be the best testing ground for establishing the basis for such a theory. 
The theory of event coding may help explain why the precision of effortless action 
can appear “nonintentional” while attention is intensely focused on rapidly arising 
cues.




1. Social automaticity In their contribution to this volume, Joshua Ackerman and 
John Bargh review the extensive literature on the automaticity of social coordination, 
suggesting three general mechanisms that may account for it: simple dynamical 
systems at the level of mechanics (e.g. synchronized rocking in rocking chairs), shared 
perception–action representations (e.g., priming), and active motivations. They con-
clude that the automaticity of social coordination has several qualities that may be 
relevant to corollary qualities in flow: reduced experience of effort, transcendence of 
the negative aspects of the self, positive affect, and interpersonal fluency. Ackerman 
and Bargh go on to make a case for flow’s being a special case of automaticity, explain-
ing that the conscious awareness does not, itself, drive the experience of flow and is, 
instead, a passive spectator.
Topic : Expertise
Overview
Attention and its relation to performance have been an intense topic of research, 
exemplified by the conference and volume Attention and Performance’s appearing bien-
nially since 1966. There appears to be a very close link between expert performance 
and effortlessness. Although the learning of a highly refined skill involves intense 
effort over extended periods (Ericsson and Lehmann 1996), its execution at the highest 
level is often characterized from a first-person perspective as feeling effortless and from 
a third-person perspective as appearing effortless. How to build this level of expertise 
and how it is executed have been the object of a number of interesting lines of 
research.
For instance, Sian Beilock and colleagues (Beilock, Bertenthal, McCoy, and Carr 
2004; Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, and Starkes 2002) have found, when comparing sport 
performance of novices and experts, that experts perform better at full attentional 
capacity, even if their attention is occupied by irrelevant details, such as distractors 
or an artificial speed requirement.
Focused attention is attention that is voluntarily concentrated on a single 
domain of stimuli. The limited attention of lower animals can be understood as invol-
untarily focused attention. Ethologist Reuven Dukas (2002) has suggested that limited 
attention in lower animals may have an adaptive advantage, and Csikszentmihalyi 
(1978) has noted the advantages of focused attention in autotelic experience. Drawing 
from a series of studies involving computer simulations, Dehaene and Changeux 
(2005) have postulated that when human attention is captured in high-level cortical 
activity, the processing of domain-specific stimuli is facilitated while that of other 
stimuli is inhibited, perhaps accounting for the phenomenon of inattentional 
blindness.




Effortlessness is often characterized by an experience of completely focused attention. 
It is a mystery, however, as to why attempting to give full attention to an activity at 
which one is completely competent and which does not require full attention should 
result in a performance decrement. It may be that sustaining full attention in a task 
that does not demand it is simply not possible for any length of time (but why?) and 
that free cognitive resources will be involuntarily drawn to competing targets of atten-
tion, drawing with them some of the cognitive resources required for the original 
task.
Theory
The Dehaene and Changeux model (2005) seems to most easily match autotelic experi-
ence—as opposed to normal experience—because full attention that inhibits non-
domain stimuli is difficult to maintain outside of autotelic experience. A theory of 
effortlessness should include the mechanisms for the capture and release of full atten-
tion in autotelicity and seek to answer the question of whether the capturing can be 
facilitated or the releasing can be inhibited through training.
Advances
1. The explicit system and perfectionism Related to the chapters by Austin, DeCaro and 
Beilock, and Wulf and Lewthwaite mentioned above, the contribution to this volume 
from Arne Dietrich and Oliver Stoll considers evidence, first, for the downregulation 
of specific brain areas during effortless attention and, second, for the important rela-
tionship between attention and performance. Dietrich and Stoll begin by explaining 
the explicit–implicit distinction in cognitive processing and suggest that some activi-
ties can facilitate a neurophysiological process that shuts down modules of the explicit 
system. They then weigh in on the long-standing issue of the value of perfectionism 
by distinguishing two kinds, one of which draws processing through the explicit 
system and the other through the implicit system—the former being deleterious in 
attempts to achieve flow.
2. The physiology of flow Related to the work of Moller, Meier, and Wall described 
above, Fredrik Ullén, Örjan de Manzano, Töres Theorell, and László Harmat have suc-
cessfully induced flow in the lab and examined its physiological correlates. Through 
these studies, they have found that the physiological correlates (measured in skin 
conductance, electromyography of facial muscles, and respiratory and cardiovascular 
dimensions) of effortless attention are, indeed, unique, sharing some features with the 
state of joyous arousal and importantly distinct from the state of effortful attention. 
Through further measurements of personality traits, including flow proneness, 
they found that flow proneness is not correlated with the capacity for sustained effort-
ful attention, nor with general intelligence in leisure activities, and is negatively 
correlated with general intelligence in maintenance and professional activities.
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Topic : Mental Training
Overview
In the West, expertise has traditionally been viewed as a combination of inborn ability 
and effortful practice. While some valuable attempts have been made on a descriptive 
level (Jackson and Csikszentmihalyi 1999; Kremer and Scully 1994; Moran 1996) and 
while there have been calls for a program of research in this area (Moran 1996)—and 
while popular psychology has been flooded with speculation and anecdotal evidence 
of the efficacy of mental training (Grout and Perrin 2004; Kauss 2001; Kuehl, Kuehl, 
and Tefertiller 2005; Millman 1999)—just as with the topic of effortlessness, compara-
tively little progress has been made in explaining scientifically the processes and 
effectiveness of mental training. In the East, we find a situation in which effortlessness 
and mental training have been topics of philosophical speculation for millennia. 
Edward Slingerland (2003) has documented a direct concern with effortless action 
across numerous schools of thought in ancient China, Brian Bruya (2010) has taxono-
mized effortlessness as spontaneity in early China and identified allied notions in the 
history of Western philosophy, and volumes too numerous to mention have been 
written on the methods of meditation and mindfulness in Hindu and Buddhist 
philosophy.
Over the past few decades, these methods and concerns have gradually been trick-
ling into the cognitive science literature—for example, in Maturana and Varela’s 
concept of autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1980), Ellen Langer’s work on mindful-
ness (Langer 1989), and James Austin’s neurological analysis of meditation (Austin 
1998, 2006, this volume).
Effortlessness involves two important characteristics: (1) full attention and (2) a 
dropping away of a salient sense of self. Meditation practices involve the cultivation 
of these two mental states, and recent research has shown that neural plasticity in 
adult humans is more extensive than previously believed. Bengtsson and Ullén have 
shown that piano practice can influence white matter structure well into adulthood 
(Bengtsson et al. 2005). In separate studies, Lutz and colleagues (Lutz, Greischar, Rawl-
ings, Ricard, and Davidson 2004) and Davidson and colleagues (Davidson et al. 2003) 
have shown that long-term meditators can alter neuronal structures that are impli-
cated in high-attention states. Their results show that their subjects are able to volun-
tarily induce not only high-amplitude gamma oscillations but also long-distance 
gamma synchrony. Equally important is that these subjects’ baseline EEG spectral 
profiles differed significantly from those of the control subjects, demonstrating the 
possibility of long-term neural changes through meditative practice.
B. Rael Cahn and John Polich undertook a comprehensive review of neurological 
studies of meditation (Cahn and Polich 2006) that confirms the positive effects of 
meditation on attention. B. Alan Wallace, a former Tibetan Buddhist monk and 
now an active scholar, has produced a series of books that explain the elements of 
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attentional training in the Buddhist idiom (Wallace and Houshmand 1992; Wallace 
and Houshmand 1999) and has more recently attempted to interpret these in relation 
to advances in cognitive science (Wallace 2003; Wallace and Tsoçn-kha-pa Blo-bzaçn-
grags-pa 2005; Wallace 2007). According to Wallace, Buddhists view meditation as a 
metaskill, a skill that is applicable to multiple domains. This skill, he says, can be cul-
tivated by anyone and begins with a concerted effort to diminish self-centeredness. 
The result of the training, he says, is extensive cognitive–affective control, positive 
affect, and a robust prosocial attitude.
John Kabat-Zinn reports that an 8- to 10-week group program in mindfulness 
meditation training can produce short- and long-term positive results in reducing 
anxiety and pain (Kabat-Zinn et al. 1992; Miller, Fletcher, and Kabat-Zinn 1995). 
Wallace claims that it takes six months to a year of full-time meditation practice, 
under conducive conditions and with appropriate preparation and instruction, for a 
person to achieve a state of sustainable effortless attention (Wallace and Houshmand 
1999).
Challenges–Gaps
While researchers have had significant success in examining the neural correlates of 
attention on the one hand and the parameters for improving performance within a 
domain of activity on the other, the neural confluence of these two topics has been 
relatively neglected. According to Marc Jeannerod (2006), evidence supports the 
hypothesis that representing an action and executing it are distinct but functionally 
equivalent. If representing an action is essentially practicing an action, then visualiza-
tion, observation, and any steps that support or promote these will have an impact 
on cultivating skills that contribute to high-level effortless action.
In the East, many claims have been made regarding taxonomies of higher levels of 
focused attention/concentration/absorption, but there is little agreement on particular 
terminology or functional demarcations. It is unclear with how much precision we 
can conceptualize any natural neurological and developmental boundaries of different 
kinds of attention and of levels of focused attention for objective study.
Theory
A question that a theory of effortlessness must attempt to answer is to what extant 
mental training conducted in one domain is transferable to other domains. Further, 
is there such a thing as metamental training—mental training that is conducted 
outside of a specific domain but which is applicable across domains? Anecdotal evi-
dence from Buddhist publications suggests that meditation and mindfulness training 
could offer such a metamethod. If such a claim turns out to be supported by empirical 
evidence, it could have broad implications for clinical application, formal education, 
and other kinds of training.
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A complete theory of effortless attention and action would include not only precise 
definitions of basic terms of attention but also a taxonomy of stages of attentional 
training.
Advances
1. Evidence for improved attention through general training In their contribution, Michael 
Posner, Mary Rothbart, M. R. Rueda, and Yiyuan Tang trace measurements of tem-
peramental effortful control in parents and children to specific brain networks and 
the brain networks to specific gene alleles, demonstrating natural individual differ-
ences in attentional capacity. They go on to demonstrate that these differences can 
be significantly influenced through environmental factors. Testing the potential of 
attentional training, Posner and colleagues found that five days of computerized task 
training in young children can result in increased activity in the anterior cingulate 
cortex, a general and persistent increase in IQ, and an increase in affective regulation. 
In adults, in a double-blind study in which subjects were trained for only 20 minutes 
per day over five days in a systematic method of mind–body attention, subjects 
showed improvement in executive attention, lower negative affect, lower fatigue, and 
lower stress compared to both controls and subjects who underwent generic relaxation 
training.
Conclusion
The phenomena of effortless attention and action provide an unexplored opportunity 
to test and probe current models of attention and action and extend them in 
directions that not only are valuable academically but could potentially have a sig-
nificant impact on human flourishing.  Each of the chapters in this volume has 
implications that bear on a variety of different aspects of attention and action 
discussed above. 
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Notes
1. Reduction in effort is often associated with a concomitant reduction in attention (Dehaene, 
Kerszberg, and Changeux 2001). Here, however, “effortless” means a reduction of felt effort only, 
with attention preserved or even enhanced.
2. Action in autotelic experience should be distinguished from overlearned action. Overlearned 
action is a reduction in effort in the face of a sustained high level of challenge within a domain 
diachronically, whereas action in autotelic experience is a reduction in effort in the face of a sus-
tained high level of challenge synchronically. The execution of action in autotelic experience 
typically depends on overlearned action, whereas overlearned action does not necessarily entail 
the achievement of autotelic experience. Also, overlearned action seems to reduce effort by bring-
ing action out of attention, freeing up cognitive resources for other things, whereas autotelicity 
is marked by the paradox of minutely sensitized attention coupled with a diminution of subjec-
tive will.
3. If objective effort in autotelic experience is found to decrease along with subjective effort, 
while efficacy is maintained, the standard models would be challenged even more radically.
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